| Q25. Nobert Wiener in his Cybernetics |
It was a perfect catharsis for half-baked ideas, insufficient self-criticism, exaggerated self-confidence, and pomposity.
For many yearsDr Rosenbluh and I had shared the conviction that the most fruitful areas for he growth of the sciences were those which had been neglected as a mo-man's land between the various established fields.
Since that time, science has been increasingly the task of specialists, in fields which show a tendency to grow progressively narrower.
A man may be a topologist or an accoustician or coleopterist. He will be filled with the jargon of his field, and will know all its literature and all its ramifications, but, more frequently than not, he will regard the next subject as something belonging to his colleague three doors down the corridor, and will considier any interest in it on his own part as an unwarrantable breach of privacy.
Dr Rosenbluethhas always insisted that a properexploration of these balnk spaces on the map of science could only be made by a team of scientists, such a specialist in his own field but each possessing a throughly sound and trained acquaintances with the fields of his neighbors; all in the habit of working together, of knowing one another's intellectural customs, and of recognizing the significance of a colleague's newe suggestion before it has taken on a full formal expression.
We had dreamed for years of an instituition of independent scientists, working together in one of them backwoods of science, not as subordinates of some great eecutive officer, but joined by the desire, indeed by the spiritual necessity, to understand the region as a whole, and to lend one another the strength of that understanding.
After much consideration, we have come to the conclusion that all the existing erminology has too heavy a bias to one side or another to serve the future development of the field as well as it should; and as happens so often to scientists, we have been forced to coin at least one artificial neo-Greek expression to fill the gap.
The philosophy of Liebniz centers about two closely related concepts - that of a universal symbolism and that of a calculus of reasoning.
Within any world with which we can communicate, the direction of time is uniform.
... Charles Darwin and Alfred Wallace. This step was the realization that a mere fortuitous variation of the individuals of a species might be casrved into the form of a more of less one-directional or few-directional progress for each line by the varying degrees of viability of the several variations, either from the point of view of the individual or of the race.
Bergson emphasized the difference between the reversible time of evolution and biology, in which there in always something new.
Spinoza, who is in many ways the continuator of this school, the doctrine of Occasionalism assumes the more reasonable form of asserting that the correspondence between mind and the matter is that of two self-contained atributes of god; but Spinoza is not dynamically minded, and gives little or no attention to the mechanism of this correspondence.
This is the situation from which Liebniz starts, but Leibniz is as dynamically minded as Spinoza is geometrically minded. He replaces the pari of corresponding elements, mind and th matter, by a consortium of corresponding elements; the monads.
As he says, they have no windows. The apparent organization of the world we see is something between a figment and a miracle. The monad is aNewtonian solar system writ small.
The key idea of Gibbs is this: in Newton's dynamics, in its original form, we are concerned with an individual system, with given initial velocities and momenta, undergoing changes according to a certain system of forces under the Newtonian laws which link force and acceleration.
Like his contemporary Heaviside, Gibbs is one of the scientists whose phsio-mathematical acumen often outstripe their logic and who are generally right, while they are often unable to eplain why and how they are right.
For the existence of any science, it is necessary that there exist phenomena which do not stand isolated. In a world ruled by a succession of miracles performed by an irrational God subjectto sudden whims, we should be forced to await each new catastrophe in a state of perplexed passiveness. We have a picture of such a world in the croquet game in Alice in Wonderland.
A very important function of the nervous system and, as we havesaid, a function equally in demand for computing machines, is that of memory, the ability to preserve the results of past operations for use in the future.
The science of today is operational; that is , it considers every statement as essentially concerned with possible experiments or observable processes. According to thi,s the study of logic must reduce to the study of the logical machine, whether nervous or mechanical, with all its non-removable limitations and imperfections.
All logic is limited by the limitations of the human mind when it is engaged in that activity known as logical thinking.
In the British empirical school of philosophy, from Locke to Hume, the content of the mind was considered to be made up of certain entities know to Locke as ideas, and to the later authores as ideas and impression. The simple ideas or impressions were supposed to exist in purely passive mind, as free from influence on the idea it contained as a clean blackboard is on the symbols which may be written on it. By some sort of inner activity, hardly worthy to be called a force, these ideas were supposed to unite themselves into bundles, according to the principles of similarity, contiguity, and cause and effect. Of these principles, perhaps the most significant was contiguity: ideas or impressions which had often occurred together in time or in space were supposed to have acquired the ability of evoking one another, so that the presence of any one of them would produce the entire bundle.